Abstract: An agent-based bioeconomic fishery model was developed to assist in the design and evaluation of management instruments in an input controlled fishery. The agent-based structure of the model enables the choice of management instruments to be tailored specifically to account for the competitive 'race to fish' behavior observed in input controlled fisheries. The optimal season length and capital investment in the absence of market failure is determined by assuming there is only one agent in the fishery that can internalize all future benefits resulting from sustainable harvest levels. This is then compared with a number of agentbased scenarios, with varying restrictions on fishing inputs, where each individual agent seeks to maximize its own fishing returns subject to its expectations of the behavior of other agents. While the results are for a hypothetical fishery, the model provides estimates of the economic cost of this market failure, which in turn provides a benchmark against which the cost of management can be compared.
INTRODUCTION
In order to overcome the problems associated with open access, fisheries management agencies have been established to control over-exploitation and over-capacity (Kaufmann et al. 1999 ). Whether through input or output controls, regulations are made to limit the harvesting of fishery resources to a volume that is considered sustainable over the long term and which maximizes economic returns.
In recent years computer modeling techniques have been developed to assist fishery managers design appropriate regulations. Fishery models range from biophysical models of fish stocks used to generate stock assessments and estimate the maximum sustainable yield, to integrated bioeconomic models that can comprehensively investigate economic efficiency concerns within fisheries. Because each of the agents, ie. firms or individuals, participating in a fishery seek to maximize its own interests, including agent-based behavior in bioeconomic modeling enables a more realistic assessment of management controls within a fishery.
THE MODEL FRAMEWORK
The model represents a single species fishery, based on tiger prawn data collected from the northern prawn fishery. It is a dynamic model containing both a biological and economic representation of the fishery and is formulated as an optimal control problem. With the model, the optimal length of the fishing season and annual investment in fishing power of vessels can be determined. The optimality criterion is that the net present value (NPV) of returns to the fishery over a given planning horizon is maximized.
Biological component
The stock-recruitment relationship defined by equations 1 and 2 determine the number of recruits to the fishery each year based on the size of the existing stock base (refer to appendix for variable and parameter definitions).
There is an age structure to the stocks, with recruits entering the fishery at 6 months, and living for approximately 12 months. The model is based on a weekly time step and at each step the age of each cohort is progressed. Equation 3 calculates the number of fish stocks in the first age cohort, and equation 4 calculates the number of fish stocks for all other age cohorts. A slightly modified equation is used when estimating stocks in the final age cohort. 
Behavioral Component

Fishing activity
The fishing activity relates fishing effort to catch (equations 5-12). Agents are able to increase fishing power, which in turn influences the effectiveness of fishing effort, by increased investment in vessel capital κ. The catch per unit of effort for each agent is monitored and fishing ceases for the year when the returns to fishing effort fall below a critical value. 
Catch is derived from fishing mortality f and the level of stock in the fishery at any given point in time. The age structure of the prawn stocks makes it possible to calculate the weight of the catch at each time step. This in turn enables the prawn catch to be graded and priced accordingly for calculations of gross revenue.
Economic dynamics
Gross revenue from fishing is calculated using total catch, its composition by grade, and prices for the various grades of prawns (equation 13). Annual gross revenue (AREV) is calculated by aggregating the weekly gross revenue (WREV) over the year.
Variable fishing costs incorporate packaging, fuel and crew costs based on ABARE surveys of the fishery. Packaging costs are dependent on the weight of the catch. Fuel costs are estimated as a function of effort and reflect both the price of fuel in the region and the geographic spread of fishing effort. Crew costs are estimated as a fixed percentage of catch revenue. The cost of capital locked up in vessels and the cost of any additional investments made to increase fishing power are represented by fixed annual costs. Net returns are calculated as the difference between gross revenue and total fishing costs (equations 14-16). They are reported in net present value terms.
Optimal control framework
The model is formulated as an optimal control problem to determine the optimal length of the fishing season and the annual cost of additional vessel capital. The criterion is to generate the highest possible net present value in the fishery over a five year planning horizon. The length of the planning horizon was dictated in part by computational limits. However, the species of prawn studied are a relatively short-lived species and a five year planning horizon is more than three times their expected lifetime. A genetic algorithm (GA) search technique was employed to find solutions for several problems formulated.
Modeling agents
Six agents, representing the vessels operated by six individuals or firms, were incorporated into the model. Each operator is assumed to control half of the vessels in one of three broad categories in the fleet: small, medium and large vessels. The three vessel categories are based on engine capacity. The cost structure and estimated fishing power for each category was based on survey data. The vessels within each category are assumed to be identical with the same fishing power and cost structure.
To model the competing interests of the agents in the fishery, the model contains independent GAs, in which each agent maximizes its annual net economic returns. The performance of an agent's strategy depends on the strategies employed by the other agents in the fishery. Robust strategies for each agent are developed and the model converges to a solution.
MANAGEMENT OF A SINGLE-FIRM FISHERY
A problem was formulated to investigate profit maximizing behavior in the fishery where one firm is able to fully capture the stream of returns generated over time. Unlike for the problem with multiple independent agents, a single GA was used to determine the joint optimal strategy of all six vessel groups. This generates a solution analogous to that for one firm owning all interests in the fishery. This solution provides the best combination of fishing inputs over the length of the planning horizon and the economically efficient harvest rate that is sustainable over the longer term.
With a relatively short planning horizon and if no economic value is placed on the fish stocks that remain at the end of the time horizon, even a single-firm fishery will decide to run down the fishery resource toward the end of the period. With computing capabilities limiting the length of the planning horizon, it was necessary to add a value for the stocks remaining at the end of the planning horizon to the objective function.
The objective function for the single-firm problem was therefore specified as:
where λ is the shadow price of s (see (2)) and y T is the last year of the time horizon.
Although there are various procedures to obtain terminal values based on shadow prices (see Cao et al. 2001 ), a judicious guess of a shadow price for remaining stocks was found to eliminate the tendency of the model to run down the fishery resource towards the end of the period analyzed. The results presented below are based on a terminal value of $8/kg. This value was selected because stock levels remaining at the end of the planning horizon, together with effort, catch and net returns, were found to be relatively stable for terminal values between $6 and $9 per kilogram.
Optimal fishing behavior
With the objective function (17) the optimal strategy of the single-firm controlling all six vessel groups generates an average annual catch of around 3800 tonnes and net economic returns of around $100 million over the five years. Throughout the time horizon considered remaining stock levels are around 5000 tonnes.
The optimal combination of fishing vessels in this problem involves the two groups of large vessels fishing for most of the year with additional investment in vessel capital occurring in the majority of the five years of the planning horizon. Only one medium size vessel group is used, and for only a short period in the third and fourth years. It was not optimal for the remaining vessel groups to fish.
The tendency for the single operator to use larger vessels instead of smaller vessels reflects the greater efficiency of the larger vessels in the fleet. This is consistent with the past and likely future evolution of the fleet towards larger boats.
MANAGEMENT OF A FISHERY WITH MULTIPLE AGENTS
Agents in an unmanaged fishery have an incentive to over-fish and it is possible to model this behavior explicitly. A scenario was designed where each of the six operators, represented by six separate GAs, maximizes its annual net economic returns in each of the five years considered. Unlike the single firm scenario the agents place no terminal value on the stocks remaining at the end of the planning horizon. The objective function of this unregulated agentbased problem is therefore specified for each agent as: 
An unmanaged fishery with multiple agents
A problem was formulated of an unmanaged fishery with six agents. Each agent was allowed to fish any weeks of the year and with as much investment in vessel capital as desired at the prevailing lease cost. The results show that agents adopt a strategy that involves significant fishing effort. All agents begin the five year period with significant investment in vessel capital and choose to fish a significant proportion of the year.
In the first year fishing is more than eight times as high as in the single-firm problem. Catch levels are more than three times as high and NPV returns almost double. This seriously depletes stock levels, with around 70 per cent less stock remaining at the end of the first year in this problem relative to the single-firm problem. In subsequent years fishing effort declines because lower stock levels result in significantly reduced catch and a decline in the returns to fishing effort. Over the five year planning horizon the net economic returns to the fishery are around 60 per cent lower than in the single-firm problem. 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DIFFERENT MANAGEMENT CONTROLS
Without a guaranteed share of the total allowable catch at the beginning of the season, input controlled fisheries are characterized by 'race to fish' behavior. The inability to regulate all fishing inputs enables operators to substitute unregulated fishing inputs for regulated ones, thereby partially offsetting the targeted reduction in fishing effort. This effort creep problem requires continual monitoring and adjustment of regulations to ensure stock levels are not depleted over the longer term. By imposing regulations on only the length of the fishing season it is possible to estimate the magnitude of effort creep resulting from vessel improvements. The model can also be used to analyse the effectiveness of a variety of different reductions in the length of the fishing season.
Restricting the length of the season
Initially the model was run with a fishing season lasting the entire year and this was then reduced in 10-week decrements to a 12 week fishing season. Reductions in the season length were found to have a positive effect on the net economic returns to the fishery. A 37 week long fishing season resulted in a NPV of economic returns of around $46.3 million over the five year planning horizon. Further reductions in season length generated higher net economic returns. With a season length of 22 weeks, the net economic return to the fishery over the planning horizon in net present value terms was an estimated $58.6 million, representing a more than 40 per cent increase from its value for the agentbased problem with an unrestricted fishing season. Table 1 reports the performance of the fishery under a number of different season length assumptions. The variability in the effectiveness of season closure in reducing effort and increasing stock levels is apparent when comparing the five week reduction from 37 to 32 weeks with a five week reduction from 22 to 17 weeks. Reducing the season from 37 to 32 weeks reduces fishing effort by more than 13 per cent and increases the NPV of the economic returns by more than 20 per cent. In contrast, reducing the season from 22 to 17 weeks is less effective. Effort is only reduced by around 7 per cent and the returns to the fishery are increased by less than 5 per cent.
In both cases overall catch levels are reduced by less than one per cent as operators increase their investment in vessel capital to compensate for the loss in season length. Figure 1 shows that if this effort creep is not restricted a season length of around 12 weeks is required to generate equilibrium stock levels considered sustainable in the single-firm scenario.
While a shorter fishing season reduced fishing effort, improved the economic performance of the fishery and resulted in higher stock levels at the end of the planning horizon, figure 1 shows that the relationship between the length of the fishing season and final stock levels is not linear. Final stock levels appear to be relatively insensitive to a reduction in the fishing season from 32 to 22 weeks. In contrast, reductions from 42 to 32 weeks and from 22 to 12 weeks appear to have a more significant effect on stock levels at the end of the planning horizon.
Reducing effort creep through restrictions on investment in vessel capital
When the fishing season was restricted to 22 weeks operators were observed to increase their investment in vessel capital, partially offsetting the attempt to limit fishing effort and preserve '
This nonlinearity is likely to reflect the lumpy nature of investment in fishing capital. When the ' With no investment in vessel capital allowed to occur operators were found to increase the number of vessels that fished the entire 22 week season. The two operators running smaller vessels were found to fish every week of the season. The agents operating the larger vessels in the fleet also increased the number of weeks fished. Fishing effort, measured in days, increased by around 9 per cent. Despite this, constraints on investment in vessel capital to improve fishing power resulted in lower overall catch levels.
The net economic returns to the fishery when investment in vessel capital is constrained to zero were higher than for the problem with investment in capital increase fishing power. This problem provides an indication of the economic cost of this form of effort creep. Over five years in present value terms the net returns to the fishery are about $6 million higher. This represents the economic gain resulting from the elimination of inefficient investment in vessel capital. It also provides an indication of the upper limit that fishery managers could spend to eliminate the problem through the introduction of additional regulations.
In addition to increasing net economic returns to the fishery by around $6 million over the planning horizon, restricting investment in vessel capital leads to higher stock levels. When no restrictions are placed on investment in vessel capital it was estimated that the season length needed to be reduced to around 12 weeks to ensure stock levels similar to those for the single-firm problem to be sustainable over the longer term. When restrictions are placed on investment in vessel capital a 22 week fishing season generates final stock levels slightly higher than those for the single-firm problem. These results suggest that by controlling effort creep caused by investment in vessel capital it is possible to have a longer fishing season generating higher net economic returns while still ensuring the long term sustainability of the fishery resource.
CONCLUSIONS
Modeling competing agents in a fishery explicitly captures the 'race to fish' behavior observed in input controlled fisheries. Using this modeling approach it is possible to capture the incentive operators face to substitute unregulated fishing inputs as the use of regulated inputs are restricted. This insight into how operators are likely to react to different management controls in their efforts to maximize their economic returns can be used to better design fishery regulations. It also highlights the limited effectiveness of input controls to ensure sustainable harvest rates when too few fishing inputs are regulated. Estimates of the economic cost of effort creep can also assist fishery managers in making decisions to address the problem with maximum total economic efficiency. That is, to ensure the cost of management does not exceed the benefits of control.
Further work with this modeling approach could enhance the usefulness of the technique. Improved modeling, particularly the use of different solution techniques to reduce the computation burden, could increase the detail with which a fishery can be modeled. Additional development may also enable the analysis of the behavior of multiple agents within output controlled fisheries to compare the effectiveness of different approaches to fishery management.
